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Abstract: We propose the Point Beauty Contest, a mechanism to identify the distribution of focal 
points on the individual level. By contrast to conventional coordination, subjects coordinate by the 
distribution of points. This allows for nuanced coordination strategies, as subjects can invest in 
multiple alternatives at the same time and weigh their choice. A subject´s strategy choice then 
reveals her perception of the distribution of focal points. In an experiment on the elicitation of 
social norms, we compare the mechanism with conventional coordination. The data confirms the 
theoretical predictions regarding coordination behavior and demonstrates that the proposed 
technique is suited to identify the distribution of focal points on the individual level. Using Monte 
Carlo simulations, we find that the proposed mechanism identifies focal points on the population 
level more efficiently than conventional coordination. We point to the possibility of using the 
mechanism as a simple method to directly measure strategic uncertainty. 
 
Highlights: 
• A method to identify the distribution of focal points on the individual level is proposed 
• In an experiment, the proposed method is compared to conventional coordination 
• The data demonstrates that the technique reveals focal points on the individual level 
• On the aggregate level, the proposed technique identifies focal points more efficiently 
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1. Introduction 
Schelling (1960) argues that in coordination games with multiple equilibria, subjects perceive 
varying degrees of saliences regarding the available alternatives. This renders some of the 
equilibria more or less “focal” and constitutes an implicit coordination device.1 Focal points are 
interesting not only because they help subjects coordinate, but because of their potential to reveal 
shared perceptions. For example, in the original version of the Keynesian Beauty Contest (Keynes, 
1936), respondents are provided with pictures of women, and their task is to coordinate on the most 
attractive pictures. According to Schelling´s concept, focal points might be induced by prevalent 
beauty ideals within the guessers´ population. Capitalizing on the same mechanism, Krupka and 
Weber (2013) propose using coordination games to elicit social norm perception.2 
 In the described settings, however, subjects choose only one alternative. As a result, the 
coordination choice of a single participant only reveals which alternative she considers most focal. 
For example, a subject´s coordination choice in the Keynesian Beauty Contest reveals which 
picture the respondent considers most salient, but it is not identified which picture is ranked second 
or third. In order to analyze how one alternative relates to other alternatives in terms of focality and 
to determine a ranking, it is necessary to combine the choices of many participants.3 Yet, such a 
ranking would only emerge on the population level, i.e., based on the choices of many participants. 
By contrast, the ranking of focal points on the individual level, i.e., regarding a single respondent, 
remains unidentified. This results from the nature of the technique since subjects can only bet on 
one alternative. 
 We propose the Point Beauty Contest, a method that allows eliciting the ranking of focal points 
on the individual level. The Point Beauty Contest allows participants to bet on multiple outcomes 
 
 1 Schelling (1960) himself conducted a series of informal experiments to illustrate this effect. For example, he asked 
subjects whether they would pick either “heads” or “tails” in a coordination game. Of the 42 respondents, 36 chose 
heads. As no formal differences between the strategies or the respective equilibria were present in that setting, he 
concluded that the obvious presence of a coordination device could only be attributed to shared perceptions and that, 
apparently, “heads” appeared to be more focal than “tails”. Since then, both experimental and theoretical work has 
corroborated the relevance of focal points in a variety of coordination settings (e.g., Binmore and Samuelson, 2006; 
Casajus, 2000; Crawford et al., 2008; Fehr et al., 2018; Isoni et al., 2013, 2014, 2019; Janssen, 2001, 2006; Metha et 
al. 1992, 1994a, 1994b; Pope et al., 2015; Sudgen, 1995; Sugden and Zamarrón, 2006). 
 2 In that approach, subjects are confronted with the description of a particular behavior and they have to coordinate 
on appropriateness ratings. The method assumes that social norms are constituted through shared perceptions 
(Crawford and Ostrom, 1995), which thereby determine the focality of alternatives. Consequently, subjects´ 
coordination choices reveal perceptions about prevailing social norms. 
 3 The term focality is meant to represent the degree to which an alternative appears to be focal to a player. 
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and to weigh their choices. In contrast to conventional coordination, where subjects coordinate by 
choosing one alternative, subjects are equipped with a budget of points that they can distribute 
among multiple alternatives. Like in conventional coordination games, subjects are incentivized to 
reveal their beliefs about the other participants´ behavior, as they are paid according to the precision 
with which they anticipate the other participants´ choices. While coordination with a single choice 
reveals the most focal alternative, this approach allows the elicitation of the ranking of focal points 
on the level of a single participant. 
 Fine-grained coordination is present in many real-world coordination settings. In a bank run, 
for example, depositors might not only think about withdrawing none of their money or all of their 
money from a bank. Instead, due to a conflict of pecuniary incentives (play withdrawal) and social 
preferences (play no withdrawal), a subject might want to engage in both strategies simultaneously. 
The proposed mechanism captures two aspects of such a setting. First, subjects can invest in 
multiple alternatives in a coordination setting. Second, accordingly, the coordination outcome not 
only depends on the number of subjects choosing a particular alternative, but also on the weights 
that are put on the alternatives. Thus, the Point Beauty Contest provides a framework that reflects 
the interaction between subjects when nuanced strategy choices are feasible.4 
 We analyze the Point Beauty Contest both theoretically and experimentally. In the theoretical 
part, we derive predictions for coordination behavior that depend on risk preferences and strategic 
uncertainty. In an experiment on the elicitation of social norms (Krupka and Weber, 2013), we 
compare the proposed mechanism with conventional coordination. On the aggregate level, we find 
that the coordination outcomes correspond, i.e., the average ranking produced by the Point Beauty 
Contest matches the ranking elicited using the conventional approach. Looking at the choices on 
the subject level confirms the theoretical predictions and demonstrates that the proposed technique 
is suited to identify the ranking of focal points on the individual level. Moreover, using Monte 
Carlo simulations, we find that the Point Beauty Contest identifies focal points on the population 
level more efficiently, as it yields a given level of precision about the underlying distribution with 
significantly fewer subjects. 
 
 4  Note that such kind of nuanced strategies conceptually differ from mixed strategies, where subjects assign 
probabilities to every pure strategy. Instead, in the Point Beauty Contest, subjects engage in multiple strategies at the 
same point in time. 
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 We see several fields of application for the Point Beauty Contest. First, the mechanism is suited 
to reflect coordination settings where fine-grained coordination is feasible. This allows to study 
coordination behavior when subjects opt for nuanced coordination strategies that involve 
engagement in multiple alternatives. Second, the mechanism allows to uncover the distribution of 
focal points in coordination games on the individual level. That is, subjects not only reveal the most 
salient alternative in a coordination setting but reveal their ranking of saliences. Third, the 
mechanism is useful when an experimenter is interested in the identification of focal points on the 
population level with fewer resources since the Point Beauty Contest yields results that are as 
precise as the results from conventional coordination with substantially fewer subjects. 
 The Point Beauty Contest also contributes to the elicitation of social norms using coordination 
games. As Krupka and Weber (2013) state, their results show that “a social norm is not always a 
single action that should or should not be taken, but rather a profile of varying degrees of social 
appropriateness for different available actions”. 5  Social norms as such a profile can only be 
detected on the population level with conventional coordination, while the Point Beauty Contests 
elicits such profile of social norm perception on the subject level. 
 Finally, the Point Beauty Contest serves as a simple and direct tool to measure strategic 
uncertainty in coordination games, as the assignment of points depends on the risk preferences and 
the degree of strategic uncertainty that the subjects perceive. Controlling for risk preferences thus 
allows isolating the degree of strategic uncertainty on the individual level. For example, 
Heinemann et al. (2009) propose to measure strategic uncertainty by eliciting certainty equivalents 
and identify the payment that renders a subject indifferent between the certain payoff and an 
uncertain payoff that is subject to strategic uncertainty. Our approach would facilitate the elicitation 
of uncertainty in strategic settings, as the subject´s behavior (i.e., the distribution of points) reflects 
a direct measure for that kind of uncertainty. 
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains the theoretical 
framework to derive predictions for coordination behavior. Section 3 presents the experiment and 
section 4 the experimental results. Section 5 contains simulations results on efficiency 
measurement. Section 6 summarizes and concludes. 
 
 
 5 See the abstract of Krupka and Weber (2013). 
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2. Theoretical Framework 
2.1. The Game 
Consider a one-shot coordination game where subjects 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑛 see alternatives 𝑗 = 1, … , 𝑚. 
Each subject receives a budget of 𝑋 points and distributes the points between alternatives. The 
number of points that individual 𝑖 assigns to 𝑗 is denoted as 𝑥𝑖𝑗 . All points must be used, i.e., 
∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑗
𝑚
𝑗=1 = 𝑋. We refer to the vector 𝑋𝑖 = (𝑥𝑖1, … , 𝑥𝑖𝑚) as a subject´s coordination choice. After 
all subjects decided about 𝑋𝑖, the average number of points 𝑥?̅? assigned to alternative 𝑗 is calculated 
as 𝑥?̅? = (∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑗
𝑛
𝑖=1 )/𝑛. The alternative that received most points on average is considered the winning 
alternative 𝑗∗ . If more than one alternative received the maximum number of points, 𝑗∗  is 
determined randomly among these alternatives.6 Finally, each participant receives a payoff 𝜋𝑖 that 
is proportional to the number of points 𝑥𝑖𝑗∗  that she assigned to the winning alternative, i.e., 
𝜋𝑖~𝑥𝑖𝑗∗. 
 
2.2. Belief Formation, Preferences, and Strategic Uncertainty 
Focal Points and Belief Formation. For each alternative 𝑗, a subject perceives focality 𝜑𝑖𝑗 ≥ 0 
and the vector 𝛷𝑖 = (𝜑𝑖1, … , 𝜑𝑖𝑚) determines a subject´s ranking of focalities. A subject´s 𝛷𝑖 is 
induced by the framing of the game, i.e., the question at hand. By definition, subjects assume that 
perceptions about focalities are correlated among participants and that the remaining subjects use 
it as a coordination device (Sudgen, 1995). Based on 𝛷𝑖, a subject derives beliefs 𝑝𝑖𝑗 which reflect 
the probability that alternative 𝑗 becomes the winning alternative 𝑗∗. Specifically, stronger focality 
renders the respective alternative as a more promising bet for the investment of points: 𝜑𝑖𝑘 >
𝜑𝑖𝑙 ⇔ 𝑝𝑖𝑘 > 𝑝𝑖𝑙 for two alternatives 𝑘 and 𝑙. The vector 𝑃𝑖 = (𝑝𝑖1, … , 𝑝𝑖𝑚), with ∑ 𝑝𝑖𝑗
𝑚
𝑗=1 = 1, is 
the perceived probability distribution about the coordination outcome of an individual 𝑖. 7 The 
 
 6 It is necessary that only one 𝑗 becomes the winning alternative. This ensures that subjects are not incentivized to 
equalize points among all alternatives which would maximize the profit of all participants, but render the outcome 
uninformative. 
 7 We assume that subjects perceive the probabilities to be exogenous, i.e., they do not strategically assign points in 
an attempt to influence the probability distribution. This assumption is adequate when the number of participants is 
sufficiently large. 
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translation of focalities into actual probabilities allows viewing the agent´s problem as a game 
against nature (Luce and Raiffa, 1957). 
 Preferences. Subjects exhibit von-Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions. For convenience, 
we normalize 𝜋𝑖 = 𝑥𝑖𝑗∗, so that profit will simply equal the number of points assigned to 𝑗
∗. As a 
result, utility simplifies to 𝑈𝑖 = ∑ 𝑝𝑖𝑗
𝑚
𝑗=1 𝑢(𝑥𝑖𝑗). The utility function 𝑢 is continuous and twice 
differentiable with 𝑢´(𝑥) > 0. Subjects can be risk-averse (𝑢´´(𝑥) < 0), risk-neutral (𝑢´´(𝑥) = 0) 
or risk-seeking (𝑢´´(𝑥) > 0). 
 Strategic Uncertainty and Coordination Behavior. A subject is certain if she is sure about 
the outcome of the game: 𝑝𝑖𝑗 = 1 for some 𝑗. A subject is partially uncertain if she considers at 
least one alternative 𝑘  to be more promising than another alternative l, without being fully 
confident: 0 < 𝑝𝑖𝑙 < 𝑝𝑖𝑘 < 1  for some 𝑘  and 𝑙 . A subject is fully uncertain if she is clueless 
concerning the outcome of the game: 𝑝𝑖𝑗 = 1/𝑚 for all 𝑗. 
 Accordingly, we say that a subject is gambling if she assigns all points to one alternative: 𝑥𝑖𝑗 =
𝑋 for some 𝑗. A subject is ranking if she assigns more points to one alternative 𝑘 than to another 
alternative l: 0 < 𝑥𝑖𝑙 < 𝑥𝑖𝑘 < 𝑋. A subject is hedging if she fully hedges her profit by assigning 
equally many points to all alternatives: 𝑥𝑖𝑗 = 𝑋/𝑚 for all 𝑗. 
 
2.3. Predictions for Coordination Behavior and Revelation of Focalities 
For simplicity, predictions refer to a game with two alternatives 𝑘 and 𝑙, without loss of generality. 
Table 1 shows predictions for coordination behavior depending on risk preference and strategic 
uncertainty. If subjects are either risk-averse or if subjects are certain about the coordination 
outcome, then a subject´s coordination choice 𝑋𝑖 reflects her perception of underlying focalities 
𝛷𝑖 . That is, subjects are gambling in case of certainty, they are ranking in case of partial 
uncertainty, and they are hedging in case of full uncertainty. In these cases, subjects reveal their 
ranking of focal points, as they assign more points to alternatives that are considered more 
promising: 𝑝𝑖𝑘 > 𝑝𝑖𝑙 ⇔ 𝑥𝑖𝑘 > 𝑥𝑖𝑙. Since we assume that subjects derive success probabilities of 
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alternatives based on their degree of focalitity, i.e., 𝜑𝑖𝑘 > 𝜑𝑖𝑙 ⇔ 𝑝𝑖𝑘 > 𝑝𝑖𝑙, a subject´s ranking of 
points will correspond to her ranking of focalities, i.e., 𝜑𝑖𝑘 > 𝜑𝑖𝑙 ⇔ 𝑥𝑖𝑘 > 𝑥𝑖𝑙 in these cases.
8 
Proposition 1. If an individual is risk-averse or certain about the coordination outcome, then she 
fully reveals her ranking of focalities by assigning more points to alternatives that she considers 
more focal. 
Proof. See Appendix A.2. 
 
Table 1. Predictions for Coordination Behavior 
 
Certainty: 
𝑝𝑘 = 1 
Partial uncertainty: 
0 < 𝑝𝑙 < 𝑝𝑘 < 1 
Full Uncertainty: 
𝑝𝑘 = 𝑝𝑙 
Risk-averse 𝒙𝒌 = 𝑿 𝟎 < 𝒙𝒍 < 𝒙𝒌 < 𝑿 𝒙𝒌 = 𝒙𝒍 
Risk-neutral 𝒙𝒌 = 𝑿 𝑥𝑘 = 𝑋 Indifferent 
Risk-seeking 𝒙𝒌 = 𝑿 𝑥𝑘 = 𝑋 𝑥𝑘 = 𝑋 or 𝑥𝑙 = 𝑋 
Notes: The bold printing refers to those cases where a subject’s coordination choice fully 
reflects her beliefs. 
 
3. Experiment 
3.1. Design 
We experimentally test our predictions by applying the Point Beauty Contest to elicit social norm 
perception. The idea to use coordination games to measure social norm perception has been 
proposed by Krupka and Weber (2013). In their approach, subjects are asked to evaluate a particular 
behavior (e.g., “how appropriate is it to do X?”), and they are provided with different answer 
alternatives to evaluate that behavior (e.g., “very appropriate”, “somewhat appropriate”, 
“somewhat inappropriate”, “very inappropriate”). The subjects´ task is to choose the answer of 
which they think the majority of participants would choose it. That approach is equivalent to the 
classical Keynesian Beauty Contest, in which it is not optimal for subjects to state their own 
opinion, but to anticipate the modal choice of the group. We compare their method, where subjects 
can only bet on one alternative, with our approach, where subjects can bet on multiple alternatives 
and weigh their choices. Note that the elicitation of social norm perception is just one context to 
 
 8 This also holds in a game with more than two alternatives, because the predictions apply to all pairwise comparisons 
of alternatives. 
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test the proposed mechanism. Any experimental setting, in which participants coordinate, would 
be suited for an experimental test. 
 We conduct two treatments: Classical Beauty Contest (CBC) and Point Beauty Contest (PBC). 
In both treatments, we elicit injunctive social norms (part 1) and descriptive social norms (part 2) 
for five daily life behaviors. Injunctive social norms refer to perceptions of normatively appropriate 
behavior while descriptive social norms refer to perceptions of common behavior, i.e., the behavior 
practiced by most people (Cialdini et al., 1990). Table 2 shows the five behaviors that we use for 
the elicitation of injunctive and descriptive social norms. 
 
Table 2. Items Used for the Elicitation of Social Norms 
1. Taking some money out of a found wallet before bringing it to the lost-property office. 
2. Lying for reasons of courtesy. 
3. Treating unfairly a person of which one has been treated unfairly before. 
4. Keeping the money when the cashier accidentally returned too much change. 
5. Mainly paying attention to the own well-being in daily life. 
 
 
 For the elicitation of injunctive social norms, subjects are confronted with a particular item 
and they are asked, how they evaluate the respective behavior regarding its appropriateness. 
Subjects then have to coordinate on the answer options: “very appropriate”, “somewhat 
appropriate”, “somewhat inappropriate”, “very inappropriate”. For the elicitation of descriptive 
social norms, subjects are confronted with a particular item, and they are then asked how many 
people would engage in the described behavior. Subjects then coordinate on the answer options: “a 
large majority”, “a majority”, “a minority”, “a small minority”. 
  In CBC, we employ conventional coordination, as done by Krupka and Weber (2013). That 
is, for each item, a subject receives 10€ if she manages to pick the answer alternative that is chosen 
by the majority of the respondents in the session (and zero otherwise). In the PBC, subjects are 
endowed with 100 points in each item, and their task is to distribute the 100 points between the 
available alternatives. In each item, subjects gain 0.10€ for each point that they assign to the 
winning alternative, i.e., the alternative that receives most points on average. Therefore, the payoff 
profile of CBC is also feasible in PBC, since assigning all 100 points to one alternative in PBC is 
equivalent to CBC in payoff terms. 
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 In both treatments, subjects receive detailed instructions on the coordination mechanisms in 
parts 1 and 2 and about how their payment is determined. Specifically, subjects are provided with 
several examples to illustrate how their payment is calculated depending on their behavior and the 
behavior of others. Subjects answer several control questions in which they compute profits in a 
series of hypothetical scenarios. In particular, we pay attention to make clear that subjects are not 
asked about their own opinion. To make sure that subjects consider this feature, we remind them 
on each screen, on which they enter a coordination choice, that their task is not to state their own 
opinion but to coordinate with the remaining participants in the room. 
 Finally, in part 3, we elicit risk preferences using the Eckel and Grossmann (2008) approach, 
in order to test whether risk preferences affect coordination behavior in PBC as predicted by our 
theory. In part 3, subjects have to choose one of the lotteries from the menu shown in Table 3. 
 
Table 3. Lotteries Choices Used to Elicit Risk Preferences 
Lottery 50% 50% EV Risk Preference 
1 4.00 4.00 4.00 RA 
2 3.50 5.00 4.25 RA 
3 3.00 6.00 4.50 RA 
4 2.50 7.00 4.75 RA 
5 2.00 8.00 5.00 RA 
6 1.50 9.00 5.25 RA 
7 1.00 10.00 5.50 RA / RN 
8 0.50 10.50 5.50 RN / RS 
Notes: EV = expected value; RA = risk-averse; RN = risk-neutral; RS = risk-seeking. In 
the experiment, subjects only see the first three columns. 
 
 At the end session, one of the three parts is drawn by chance to determine the payment. If part 
1 or part 2 are drawn, then one item within that part is drawn by chance, and it determined the 
payment of a subject. If part 3 is drawn, then subjects play the lottery that they previously chose. 
 
3.2. Procedure 
The experiment was programmed in z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007), and recruitment was done via 
hroot (Bock et al., 2014). In total, 158 subjects participated, and the sessions were conducted at the 
experimental lab of Heidelberg University in January and February 2018. We conducted 8 sessions, 
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each with 20 participants (except for one session with 18 participants in PBC). 80 subjects 
participated in the CBC and 78 participated in the PBC. Participation in either treatment took about 
35 minutes, and subjects earned on average 9.40€ (including a show-up fee of 5€). 
 
4. Results 
4.1. Comparison of Coordination Outcomes 
To analyze coordination choices, we quantify the answers such that the resulting scores are 
normalized between -1 and 1. Injunctive social norms are quantified as: 1 = ” very appropriate”, 
1/3 = ”somewhat appropriate”, -1/3 = “somewhat inappropriate”, -1 = “very inappropriate”. 
Descriptive social norms are quantified as: 1 = “a large majority”, 1/3 = “a majority”, -1/3 = “a 
minority”, -1 = “a small minority”. Thus, the more positive (negative) the score in part 1, the more 
appropriate (inappropriate) it is considered to engage in the described behavior. The more positive 
(negative) the score in module 2, the more common the described behavior is considered to be. 
 Figure 1 shows a comparison of mean norms elicited in CBC and PBC. Mann-Whitney-U tests 
are conducted to test whether mean outcomes differ between the treatments. We find that four items 
differ on the 5%-level (items 1, 7, 9, and 10). After correcting for multiple testing using the 
Bonferroni procedure, three items remain significant on the 5%-level (items 1, 7, and 10).9 
Generally, the results in PBC tend to be somewhat flatter than the results in CBC. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 9 We account for the fact that multiple items are used to detect treatment differences. In order to take care of the 
inflation of the overall type-I-error rate, we multiply the p-values by the number of items (i.e., by ten). 
10 
 
Figure 1. Comparison of Mean Coordination Results 
 
Notes: Items 1 to 5 are injunctive norms from part 1, and items 6-10 are descriptive norms from part 2. The more 
positive (negative) the score in items 1-5, the more appropriate (inappropriate) it is considered to engage in the 
described behavior. The more positive (negative) the score in items 6-10, the more common the described behavior 
is considered to be. 
 
 We next compare ordinal rankings (Table 4). In CBC, alternatives in each item are ranked with 
respect to the share of subjects that chose a particular alternative. In PBC, alternatives in each item 
are ranked with respect to the average number of points assigned to the alternatives. We do not find 
that the rankings systematically differ. Precisely, the rankings produced by CBC and PBC 
correspond in eight of the ten items. In two items (4 and 10), we find that the rankings do marginally 
differ, as the order of two of the four alternatives is switched. These differences, however, seem to 
result from noise, as the alternatives that do not correspond are extremely close to one another.10 
Result 1. One the aggregate level, the coordination outcomes of PBC and CBC do not differ. 
 
 
 10 For example, in item 4, in the CBC alternative 1 is chosen by 12.5% and alternative 4 by 13.8%. By contrast, in 
the PBC, alternative 1 received 18.9 points on average and alternative 4 received 17.4 points on average. That is, in 
the CBC, alternative 4 is more popular, while in the PBC, alternative 1 is more popular. From a qualitative point of 
view, however, the two alternatives seem to be equally popular in both treatments. We therefore conclude that the 
differences concerning their ranking are not systematic, but result from noise. 
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Table 4. Comparison of Rankings of Alternatives 
 Point Beauty Contest Classical Beauty Contest  
Item + + + - - - Mean + + + - - - Mean 
Ranks 
identical 
1 6 13 29 51 -0,50 1 5 40 54 -0,64 
2 27 42 22 8 0,26 15 73 11 1 0,34  
3 14 32 40 14 -0,02 11 33 53 4 0,01  
4 (19) 28 35 (17) -0,01 (13) 34 40 (14) -0,03 x 
5 22 42 27 9 0,18 25 45 29 1 0,29  
6 13 31 35 21 -0,09 4 36 44 16 -0,15  
7 58 28 10 4 0,60 75 20 4 1 0,79  
8 35 43 16 6 0,38 26 68 5 1 0,46  
9 37 38 18 7 0,37 43 44 13 1 0,52  
10 (39) (41) 14 6 0,42 (51) (46) 3 0 0,66 x 
Notes: Items 1-5 are injunctive social norms, and items 6-10 are descriptive social norms. Responses are: “very 
appropriate” (+ +), “somewhat appropriate” (+), “somewhat inappropriate” (-), “very inappropriate” (- -) in items 
1-5 and “large majority” (+ +), “majority” (+), “minority” (-), “small minority” (- -) in items 6-10. For PBC, the 
numbers represent the average numbers of points that have been assigned to the respective alternatives. For CBC, 
the numbers represent the share (in percent) of subjects that chose the respective alternative. The modal response is 
shaded. Means are calculated using the above-described scoring. The numbers in parentheses in items 4 and 10 
indicate those numbers, where the ranking of alternatives is not identical between the two treatments. 
 
4.2. Coordination Behavior and the Role of Risk Preferences in the PBC 
We look at all 780 decisions made in PBC (78 participants times 10 items per subject) and classify 
whether subjects apply gambling, ranking, or hedging. We observe almost no hedging (less than 
0.1%), but some gambling (9.1%). In most of the decisions, subjects apply ranking, i.e., they assign 
varying numbers of points to the available alternatives (90.8%). More precisely, in 34.2% of cases, 
subjects fully rank their choices by assigning varying numbers of points to all four alternatives. In 
53.4% of cases, subjects assign three different numbers to the four alternatives, and in 3.3% of 
cases, subjects assign two different numbers to the four alternatives. 
 Our theoretical framework predicts that subjects “manage” the degree of payoff risk, such that 
it suits their risk preference. Indeed, we find that the proportion of gambling is over-proportionally 
high in participants with low or negative risk aversion. While the share of gambling decisions is 
22.4% from subjects that chose lottery 7 or lottery 8 (i.e., subjects that are potentially risk-neutral 
or risk-seeking as measured by the lottery task), it is only 3.0% from participants that chose lottery 
1-6 (subjects that are clearly risk-averse as measured by the lottery task). Moreover, we examine 
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risk induced in coordination choice. Table 5 reports regression results on the standard deviation of 
the assignment of points. We find that behavior in the risk elicitation task is significantly related to 
the standard deviation of the distribution of points. The more risk-averse subjects are in the lottery 
choice, the more balanced is the distribution of points, i.e., the lower the standard deviation implied 
in the coordination choice 𝑋𝑖. Also, older subjects are more prone to coordinate in a risky manner 
in the PBC. By contrast, gender and economics study remain insignificant, once we control for 
risk-attitude. 
Result 2. In the PBC, most of the subjects rank their alternatives to some degree by assigning 
different numbers to the available alternatives. The more risk-averse subjects are, the less dispersed 
is the assignment of points. 
 
Table 5. Risk Induced in Coordination Choice 𝑋𝑖 
 Standard deviation of points assigned to alternatives 
Risk attitude 
1.830*** 
(0.480) 
 
1.792*** 
(0.521) 
Female  
-5.384*** 
(2.007) 
-1.953 
(1.985) 
Age  
0.569** 
(0.231) 
0.658*** 
(0.186) 
Economics  
0.179 
(0.460) 
0.420 
(0.429) 
Constant 
18.609*** 
(1.979) 
15.343*** 
(5.728) 
2.484 
(5.780) 
N 780 780 780 
Notes: Tobit regressions. *, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
level. The variable “risk attitude” indicates which of the lotteries (coded as number 
between 1 and 8) a subject chose. The higher the number, the less risk-averse is a 
subject. Robust standard errors are clustered on the individual level and reported in 
parentheses. As a robustness check, OLS regressions are conducted that yield the 
same results. 
 
5. Simulation 
We run Monte Carlo simulations in order to test which of the techniques uncovers the underlying 
ranking more efficiently, i.e., with fewer observations. We consider the realized coordination 
outcomes from the 78 subjects in PBC and the 80 subjects in CBC as benchmark (i.e., the results 
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described in section 4.1.). We then run Monte Carlo simulations and mimic our original experiment 
with varying numbers of n participants, with n = 1, …, 100. For each of the ten items, each n is 
simulated 10.000 times both for the CBC and the PBC. We then use the simulated data to study 
how fast the simulated results converge to the benchmark when n grows larger. The degree of 
convergence is measured using convergence of the mean and convergence of the ordinal ranking 
of the alternatives.11 Convergence of the mean is measured as realized confidence intervals (50% 
and 90%) of the simulated means. Convergence of ordinal rankings is measured as the share of 
simulated items, in which the ordinal ranking corresponds to the benchmark. The more efficient 
the mechanism, the smaller should the confidence intervals of means become when n grows larger. 
Equivalently, the more efficient the mechanism, the higher should be the share of simulated items 
in which the ordinal ranking produced by the simulation is identical with the benchmark when n 
increases. Holding a particular n constant thus allows us to compare the degree of efficiency 
between PBC and CBC. 
 The simulation results show that in the PBC, the examined confidence intervals are lower for 
each n in either of the 10 items (see Figure 2).12 That is, the precision with which the mean is 
approached when the number of participants increases is higher for the PBC for each size of n. 
Regarding convergence to the ordinal rankings, the PBC converges faster to the underlying ranking 
in 9 of the 10 items, while in one item the CBC converges faster. 
 The efficiency gains are particularly strong for the usual numbers of participants used in 
economic experiments. For example, both the 90%-confidence and the 50%-confidence intervals 
for the mean that are realized in the CBC with n = 50 participants are reached in the PBC with 
n = 30 participants already. The share of ordinal rankings that corresponds to the benchmark that 
is produced in the CBC with n = 50 is reached in the PBC already with n = 16. This indicates that 
the PBC is more efficient as an experimental method, in particular regarding the elicitation of 
ordinal rankings of focal points. 
Result 3. The PBC is more efficient than the CBC in identifying the means and the ordinal rankings 
of coordination choices on the population level. 
 
 11 To derive the mean, we use the same scoring system as in the results section. That is, the ratings are normalized 
between -1 and 1. 
 12 Figure 2 shows the average of all 10 items. In Appendix A.1 the reader finds figures of simulations results 
separately for each item. 
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Figure 2. Simulation Results 
Panel A. Convergence to the Mean Panel B. Convergence to the Ordinal Ranking 
 
 
Notes: The x-axis of both graphs indicates the n, i.e., the number of participants that is being simulated. Panel A 
shows confidence intervals of means. Panel B shows the share of simulation runs in which the ordinal ranking of a 
simulation run corresponds with the ranking of the benchmark. Both graphs contain the data of 100.000 simulation 
runs (10.000 simulation runs for each of the ten items). Appendix A.1 contains graphs of simulations separately for 
each item. 
 
6. Summary and Conclusion 
We propose a Point Beauty Contest to identify the ranking of focal points in coordination games 
on the individual level. By contrast to conventional coordination where subjects can only bet on 
one alternative, subjects are endowed with points, which they assign to the available alternatives. 
This enables subjects to bet on multiple outcomes and to weigh their choices. We examine the 
proposed method both theoretically and experimentally. In the theoretical part, we derive that the 
assignment of points depends on strategic uncertainty and risk preferences. In an experiment, we 
find that the mechanism is suited to identify the heterogeneity of focal points on the individual 
level, as most of the subjects assign varying numbers of points to the different alternatives. Using 
Monte Carlo simulations, we find the mechanism to be more efficient regarding the identification 
of focal points on the population level. 
 We see four contributions. First, the Point Beauty Contest provides a framework to formally 
represent coordination settings in which subjects do not coordinate by exclusively choosing one 
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alternative, but in which subjects coordinate in a fine-grained manner by choosing multiple 
alternatives at the same time. Second, the mechanism allows to uncover the distribution of focal 
points in coordination games on the individual level. This allows, for example, to measure social 
norms on the individual level as a profile, i.e., varying degrees of social appropriateness for 
different available actions (cf. Krupka and Weber, 2013). Third, it provides a possibility to measure 
focal points on the population level with significantly fewer participants compared to conventional 
coordination. Fourth, the Point Beauty Contest serves as a simple and direct tool to measure 
strategic uncertainty in coordination settings (Heinemann et al., 2009), as the assignment of points 
in the Point Beauty Contest yields a measure that is directly related to that kind of uncertainty. 
  
Appendix 
A.1. Simulation Results for each Item 
The graphs show simulation results separately for each of the ten items. Each simulation contains 
10.000 runs using the Monte Carlo approach. 
A.1.1. Convergence to the Mean 
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A.1.2. Convergence to the Ordinal Ranking 
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A.2. Proof of Proposition 1 
We suppress the script 𝑖 from now on and analyze a representative individual. If 𝜋 = 𝑥𝑗
∗, profit 
equals the number of points assigned to 𝑗∗. The utility function in that case is 𝑈 = ∑ 𝑝𝑗
𝑚
𝑗=1 ∗ 𝑢(𝑥𝑗). 
 Risk aversion. Take two arbitrary alternatives 𝑘 and 𝑙. We assume that 𝜑𝑘 > 𝜑𝑙 ⇔ 𝑝𝑘 > 𝑝𝑙. 
First-order conditions require that 𝑝𝑘 ∗ 𝑢´(𝑥𝑘) ≡  𝑝𝑙 ∗ 𝑢´(𝑥𝑙). If 𝑝𝑘 > 𝑝𝑙, then it needs to be that 
𝑢´(𝑥𝑘) < 𝑢´(𝑥𝑙). Since utility is marginally decreasing in case of risk aversion, it needs to be that 
𝑥𝑘 > 𝑥𝑙 . As a result, for each comparison of two arbitrary alternatives and independent from 
strategic uncertainty, utility maximization requires to assign more points to alternatives that are 
more focal: 𝜑𝑖𝑘 > 𝜑𝑖𝑙 ⇔ 𝑥𝑖𝑘 > 𝑥𝑖𝑙. 
 Risk-neutrality. Take two arbitrary alternatives 𝑘  and 𝑙 . In case of “certainty”, it is the 
dominant strategy to assign all points to the alternative that is expected to become the winning 
alternative with certainty. The same reasoning applies to a subject that perceives “partial 
uncertainty”, i.e., assigning all points to the more promising alternative is dominant. Risk-neutral 
subjects that face “full uncertainty” are indifferent between all possible distributions of points, 
since they can neither control expected profit nor can they manipulate payoff. 
 Risk-seeking. Take two arbitrary alternatives 𝑘 and 𝑙. In case of “certainty”, it is the dominant 
strategy to assign all points to the alternative that is expected to become the winning alternative 
with certainty. This maximizes the expected payoff, while risk cannot be controlled for anyway in 
case of certainty. The same reasoning applies to a subject that perceives “partial uncertainty”. In 
case of full uncertainty, risk-seeking subjects will invest all points into a random alternative. 
Although they cannot control expected payoff in case of full uncertainty, gambling will maximize 
risk, thus maximizing utility. 
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